We analyze "nice" games (where action spaces are compact intervals, utilities continuous and strictly concave in own action), which are used frequently in classical economic models. Without making any "richness" assumption, we characterize the sensitivity of any given Bayesian Nash equilibrium to higher-order beliefs. That is, for each type, we characterize the set of actions that can be played in equilibrium by some type whose lower-order beliefs are all as in the original type. We show that this set is given by a local version of interim correlated rationalizability. This allows us to characterize the robust predictions of a given model under arbitrary common knowledge restrictions. We apply our framework to a Cournot game with many players. There we show that we can never robustly rule out any production level below the monopoly production of each firm.
action for him. If the researcher is willing to assume that this is indeed common knowledge, then the richness assumption of WY would fail. In this paper, we show that we can characterize the sensitivity of equilibrium strategies without the full richness assumption. The characterization now depends on a local version of interim correlated rationalizability, rather than the usual interim correlated rationalizability defined in Dekel et al. (2007) . 1 Second, we generalize from finite-action games to nice games (Moulin, 1984) , which are commonly used in classical economic models. In these games, the action spaces are compact intervals, and the utility functions are continuous and strictly concave in own action, as in Cournot competition and differentiated Bertrand competition. The assumption of finiteaction games with finite types is used in WY to ensure measurability of a certain constructed mapping. There is no way to completely solve the measurability problem for general infinite games, but here we are able to solve the measurability problem by showing that rationalizability in nice games has a special structure. The keys are that in nice games, any rationalizable action is a best reply to a deterministic theory of the other players' actions, and that at each step in the elimination process, the set of remaining actions is an interval. A further advantage of nice games is the uniqueness of best replies. This avoids our having to allow small perturbations to lower-order beliefs; instead we can assume the parameter is mutually known up to arbitrary order, with no reference to a topology on each order of beliefs. The use of a fixed equilibrium also plays a role, by telling us that a player has a consistent theory of the actions taken by each type of the other players.
Since we do not make any richness assumption on the set of payoff functions, our result allows us to analyze the robustness of equilibrium predictions in complete information games under weaker robustness concepts, such as that given by the uniform topology. Specifically, suppose that instead of assuming common knowledge of payoffs, we assume that the exact payoffs are mutually known up to an arbitrary finite order and that it is common knowledge that the payoffs are in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the actual payoffs. Then, our result states that for an equilibrium prediction to remain valid under these slightly weaker assumptions, it must be true for all locally interim correlated rationalizable strategies.
In some important games this leads to disturbing conclusions. As an example, we consider a Cournot oligopoly with linear cost function and sufficiently many firms. We can show that in such a game any production level that is less than or equal to the monopoly production is locally rationalizable. Suppose we weaken the complete information assumption just slightly, by assuming instead that the payoffs are mutually known up to an arbitrarily high finite order and it is common knowledge that the payoffs are within an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the original payoffs. Then, our theorem tells us that even a fixed equilibrium now yields no sharper prediction than the trivial one given by mere individual rationality, that firms' productions do not exceed the monopoly level.
In the next section, we lay out our model. In Section 3, we introduce our notion of sensitivity of equilibrium strategies and present our general result. In Section 4, we study the robustness of equilibrium predictions in complete information games to the mild perturbations as in the Cournot example above. In Section 5, we present our application on Cournot oligopoly. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the literature and the role of our modeling assumptions in more detail. In particular, we present two extensions, one to multidimensional action spaces and one to infinite type spaces. Some of the proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Basic definitions
We consider n-player nice games with a possibly unknown payoff-relevant parameter θ ∈ Θ * , where Θ * is a compact metric space, and with a finite set N = {1, 2, . . . ,n} of players. In a nice game, the action space of each player i is A i = [0, 1]; the space of action profiles is A = [0, 1] n , 2 and the utility function u i : Θ * × A → R of player i is continuous in the action profile a = (a i , a −i ) ∈ A and strictly concave 3 in own action a i ∈ A i . We fix the players, action space and utility function and consider the set of games that differ in their specifications of the belief structure on θ , i.e. their type spaces, which we also call models. Formally, by a (finite) model, we mean a finite set Θ × T 1 × · · · × T n associated with beliefs
4 By associating each type t i with a belief κ t i , we encode all the relevant information about the model into types. We designate t i as a generic type and Θ × T as a model that contains t i . Remark 1. In our formulation, in any model it is common knowledge that the payoff functions are in {u(θ, ·) | θ ∈ Θ * }. Since Θ * is arbitrary, this allows arbitrary common knowledge restrictions on payoff functions.
1 Local rationalizability starts with a subset of actions for each player and applies the best-response function iteratively, instead of starting with the set of all possible actions. The word local here does not refer to local best replies or nearby types.
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Given any type t i in a type space Θ × T , we can compute the first-order belief h (Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993) . We will be interested in the subset T u of the universal type space consisting of hierarchies that can arise in finite models. That is, we consider T 
Note that under our assumptions, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s * on T u (see Yildiz, 2009 ).
We will consider singleton selections from Bayesian Nash equilibria of models, picking a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for each model such that when we put all these models together, the resulting strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the larger game. This can be thought of as a consistency requirement of a theory of selection for various games. More precisely, we will fix a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s * : T u → A in T u and pick the Bayesian Nash equilibrium s| * T with s| *
as the solution in type space T . (Notice that s| * T is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of T .) Multiple equilibria are introduced to our analysis trivially, by considering sets of equilibria s * on T u , which does not affect our analysis.
Our formulation also restricts the equilibrium action to depend only on the hierarchy of beliefs. ) is convex.
As we detail in Appendix A, this very useful result follows from the facts that the (single-valued) best-response function is continuous with respect to beliefs and that T u is a convex set when types are represented by their beliefs. This is despite the fact that s * is highly discontinuous and T u is a large, complicated type space. The result also applies to the standard universal type space.
Local interim rationalizability
We will show that the sensitivity of equilibrium strategies is characterized by a local version of (interim correlated) rationalizability (for the original version, see Dekel et al. (2007) , Battigalli (2003) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) 
The set S k i [B, t i ] consists of best replies to beliefs that assign positive probability only to the actions that are in S
As in Dekel et al. (2007) 
The following result is an extension of earlier results by Moulin (1984) and Battigalli (2003) to local interim correlated rationalizability.
Lemma 2. For any convex
That is, in a nice game, every rationalizable action is a best reply to a deterministic theory about how the other players' actions are related to their types and the underlying parameter. Here, the action of another player j may vary with θ or a third player's type because we allow all possible correlations.
Sensitivity to higher-order beliefs
In this section, we will introduce a straightforward measure of sensitivity of a strategy to higher-order beliefs and present our general result, which gives a characterization of sensitivity in terms of local interim correlated rationalizability. 
(h i (t i )).
Now imagine a researcher who only knows the first k orders of beliefs of player i and knows that he plays s * i . All the researcher can conclude from this information is that i plays one of the actions in is to the specification of beliefs at orders higher than k when the first k orders of beliefs are as specified by t i . Assuming, plausibly, that a researcher can verify only finitely many orders of a player's beliefs, all a researcher can ever know is that player i will play one of the actions in
If the researcher knew only that the strategy of i is in a given set S i , rather than knowing what his strategy is, then he could conclude from his information only that i will play an action in (i, k, t 
In particular, when s
5 Note that it would suffice to require h k i
, which by coherence entails agreement in all lower-order beliefs. We find it more intuitive to refer to agreement at orders 1 through k.
Proposition 1 tells us a way of determining how sensitive an arbitrary equilibrium s * is to the specifications of beliefs at orders higher than k: Consider the set of all actions that are played by some type according to s * , without requiring any connection to the beliefs at hand. Apply the best response operator to this set k times, allowing all possible correlations. The resulting set is precisely the set of actions that could be played by types whose first k orders of beliefs are as specified at the beginning. When the parameter space is rich enough so that all actions are played by some types, this set is simply the set of actions that survive kth-order elimination of strictly dominated actions in the interim stage. When we allow k to be arbitrarily high, this set is simply the set of all (locally) interim correlated rationalizable actions. It is immediate from their definition that the sets 
Sometimes, it may be difficult to know the set of actions played by arbitrary types according to s * , but we may still know the behavior of certain types, e.g., the common knowledge types. In that case, we can still use Proposition 1 to find a lower bound: consider the set of actions that are known to be played by some type and apply the best response correspondence k times. In that case, S k i [B, t i ] may not be decreasing in k, and one can find a better lower bound by iterating the procedure
A comparison of this result with that of WY is useful. In WY, we consider a finite action game and assume that the parameter space is so rich that every action becomes dominant at some parameter value. Then, we show that for each
[t i ] and each rationalizable strategy s i , we can perturb first k order beliefs arbitrarily slightly and change the higherorder beliefs to obtain a typet i such that s i (t i ) = a i . Here, we consider nice games instead of finite-action games. At the expense of focusing on Bayesian Nash equilibria, rather than arbitrary rationalizable strategies, we strengthen the result in two ways. First, we do not make any richness assumption, allowing arbitrary common knowledge restriction on payoffs. Instead, we give a general characterization,
Second, since the best reply is always unique, we do not need to perturb the lower-order beliefs at all, and hence our result does not refer directly to any topology on beliefs.
We will now give the proof for k = 1. Our general proof, which is in Appendix A, uses the same arguments inductively.
follows from the definitions and (2.1). Indeed, for any 
That is, we assign the probability of an action under π(·|t i , s −i ) to a type who plays that action in equilibrium, while we keep the probabilities of θ intact. It is then straightforward to check that the two conditions above are satisfied. First,
Here, the first equality is by (3.1). To see the second equality, note that both expressions are equal to the probability type t i assigns on θ . The second condition is satisfied (i.e.
(It is also clear thatt i comes from a finite space.
for all other players j. The belief oft i is defined as above, and the beliefs of all the other types are kept as in the original model each comes from.
It is crucial for the proof and the result that s * is an equilibrium. Since s * is an equilibrium, each type plays a best response to the same strategy profile s * −i of the other players. This puts a strong restriction on the actions played by different types. Indeed, we conclude thatt i plays a i by assuming that both t i andt i play a best reply to s * −i . On the other hand, in a rationalizable strategy, each type's action may be a best response to different rationalizable strategies of the other players. In that case, we could not make such assumptions, and the result need not be true.
Lemma 2 also plays a crucial role in the proof. In order for the belief κ˜t i to be well-defined, the mapping a −i → t −i [a −i ] needs to be measurable on the set of actions a −i type t i assigns positive probability when he plays a i as a best reply.
Lemma 2 allows us to focus on the "degenerate belief" for which that set, which is contained in s −i (Θ × T −i ), is finite, and therefore the mapping a −i → t −i [a −i ] is trivially measurable on that domain. Since we have uncountably many actions, without Lemma 2, we would need to consider beliefs that put positive probability on an uncountable set of actions. On such a domain, the mapping a −i → t −i [a −i ] need not be measurable.
Minimally robust predictions of equilibrium
In this section, we study the minimally robust equilibrium predictions of complete-information models. For any given complete-information model, instead of assuming that payoffs are common knowledge, we assume that the payoffs are mutually known up to a finite order k, for arbitrarily high k, and that it is common knowledge that the payoffs are within an arbitrarily small neighborhood. We show that if a prediction is robust to such a mild relaxation, then it must hold for all locally rationalizable outcomes near the solution.
Take Θ * ⊂ R and fix anyθ ∈ int(Θ * Towards finding a lower bound for the minimally-robust prediction, for any a ∈ A and any ε > 0, we write
Definition 2. For any a ∈ A andθ , the locally rationalizable set at (a,θ) is
Note that in order to compute the locally rationalizable set, one does not need to consider the payoff or information perturbations. In the complete information model, one slightly perturbs the equilibrium outcome and applies best response operator iteratively. The difference between various notions of rationalizability disappears because there is no payoff uncertainty. Finally, we assume that θ is payoff-relevant around the equilibrium value of the complete information game: 7 R denotes the set of real numbers, and for any X ⊂ R, int( X) denotes the interior of X . 8 Here, we use the term certainty instead of knowledge to emphasize that the truth axiom is not assumed, i.e., a player may be certain of something that happens to be false. For example, the common knowledge assumption that θ =θ in model T u,0 = {t CK (θ)} is weakened to common certainty when we embed 
Assumption 1. There exists a neighborhood ofθ on which, for each
Since ε is arbitrary, it follows that
Proposition 2 establishes that in order for a prediction to be robust, it must hold for all locally rationalizable actions near equilibrium. In other words, even under the strong common knowledge restrictions, one cannot make any sharper prediction than local rationalizability around equilibrium. The converse is not necessarily true, as the next example illustrates.
For every k > 0 and every ε ∈ (0, 1), consider a finite type space {θ,θ + ε} × T k,ε in which θ =θ can be mutually known up to order k and not for any higher order (e.g. consider a version of the e-mail game in which the players send messages until it becomes kth-order mutual knowledge that θ =θ 
Therefore, a prediction may not be minimally robust even if it holds for all locally rationalizable actions. In this example, s * is discontinuous at t CK (θ), while there exists a continuous equilibrium s * * on T u,ε , in which all types play 0. It is tempting to seek for a characterization by assuming continuity at t CK (θ). Unfortunately, equilibrium must be discontinuous when there are multiple locally rationalizable actions (by Proposition 2) or when there are multiple rationalizable actions and a rich set of parameters (by the result of WY). This example also shows that Assumption 1 is not superfluous in Proposition 2. To see this, take equilibrium s * * . Assumption 1 does not hold, as
A number of papers, such as Moulin (1984) and Guesnerie (2002) , have analyzed the relationship between local dominance-solvability and Cournot stability of equilibrium, i.e. stability under best-reply dynamics. Assuming common knowledge of payoffs, they show that local dominance solvability is sufficient (but not always necessary) for stability under small perturbations to equilibrium actions. Here, we assume that players do not deviate from the equilibrium strategies, but instead examine a very different kind of robustness, to small perturbations of the interim beliefs. In contrast to the prior results, we show that local dominance solvability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for our notion of robustness.
Application: Cournot oligopoly
In this section, we will show that in Cournot oligopoly with sufficiently many firms, the minimally robust prediction of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is that no firm produced more than its monopoly outcome, a trivial implication of profit maximization. That is, even a slight relaxation of the common-knowledge assumption will preclude us from making any prediction beyond the elementary fact that no firm will produce more than the monopoly outcome.
In a Cournot oligopoly with sufficiently many firms, any production level that is less than or equal to the monopoly production is rationalizable (Bernheim, 1984; Basu, 1992) . We will show that this result extends to local interim correlated rationalizability when the equilibrium of the complete information game is in the interior of A. Then, Proposition 2 implies that a researcher cannot rule out any such output level as the equilibrium output for a firm no matter how many orders of beliefs he specifies, even if he assumes that it is common knowledge that the payoffs are in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the true value and subscribes to strong refinements of equilibrium that yield unique solutions. Even a slight doubt about the payoffs in very high orders will lead a researcher to fail to rule out any outcome that is less than the monopoly outcome as a firm's equilibrium output.
On the other hand, Börgers and Janssen (1995) show that if we replicate both consumers and the firms in such a way that the cobweb dynamics is stable for the resulting demand and supply curves, then the Cournot oligopoly will be dominance-solvable. In that case, by Proposition 1, equilibrium outcomes will not be sensitive to higher-order beliefs.
Consider n firms with identical constant marginal cost c > 0. Simultaneously, each firm i produces q i at cost q i c and sell its output at price P (Q ; θ) where Q = i q i is the total supply. For some fixedθ , we assume that Θ * is a closed interval withθ ∈ int(Θ * ). We also assume that P (0;θ) > 0, P (·;θ) is strictly decreasing when it is positive, and lim Q →∞ P (Q ;θ) = 0. Therefore, there exists a uniqueQ such that P (Q ;θ) = c. We assume that, on [0,Q ], P (·;θ) is continuously twice-differentiable and P + Q P < 0.
It is well known that, under the assumptions of the model, (i) the profit function, u(q, Q ;θ) = q(P (q + Q ) − c), is strictly concave in own output q; (ii) the unique best response q * (Q −i ) to others' aggregate production Q −i is strictly decreasing on [0,Q ] with slope bounded away from 0 (i.e., ∂q * /∂ Q −i λ for some λ < 0); (iii) equilibrium outcome at t CK (θ), s * (t CK (θ)), is unique and symmetric (Okuguchi and Suzumura, 1971) . We further impose Assumption 1: q * (Q −i ; θ) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of θ at (Q −i ,θ) where
Lemma 3. In the Cournot oligopoly above, there existsn < ∞ such that for any n >n and any ε > 0,
where q
M is the monopoly output under P (·;θ) and s * (t CK (θ)) is the unique equilibrium of the complete information game {t CK (θ)}.
This is a straightforward extension of a result by Basu (1992) for rationalizability to local rationalizability. The proof is in Appendix A. Together with Proposition 2, this lemma yields the following. Proposition 3. In the Cournot oligopoly above, there existsn < ∞ such that for any n >n and any Bayesian Nash equilibrium s * , the minimally robust prediction of s * is that no firm produces more than its monopoly output q M under P (·;θ):
Proof. Since we can put a large upper bound on q, by (i) above, we have a nice game. Moreover, by Lemma 3,
by Proposition 1 and the definition of
Proposition 3 suggests that, with sufficiently many firms, any equilibrium prediction that is not implied by strict dominance will be invalid whenever we slightly deviate from the idealized complete information model. To see this, consider two researchers. One is confident that it is common knowledge that θ =θ . The other is slightly skeptical: he is only willing to concede that it is common knowledge that |θ −θ| ε and agrees with the kth-order mutual certainty of θ =θ . He is an arbitrarily generous skeptic; he is willing to concede the above for arbitrarily small ε > 0 and arbitrarily large finite k. Proposition 3 states that the skeptic nonetheless cannot rule out any output level that is implied by simple profit maximization.
Extensions and concluding remarks
We have so far made several assumptions, such as unidimensional action spaces and finite type spaces. In this section we will describe how our results can be extended beyond these assumptions and comment on our modeling choices and the literature.
Multidimensional action spaces
We have so far confined ourself to nice games, in which action spaces are unidimensional intervals and the utility functions are continuous and strictly concave in own action. These assumptions are made in order to ensure two properties:
(1) the rationalizable actions are best replies to degenerate beliefs, as in point rationalizability of Bernheim (1984) , and (2) there is always a unique best reply.
Our characterization is valid whenever these two properties hold. All of the properties of nice games are needed to imply the first property. The second property, though, holds even with multidimensional action spaces. More broadly, with unique best replies, the sensitivity of equilibrium strategies is characterized by local point rationalizability. In order to state this formally, we define local interim correlated point rationalizability, denoted byṠ ∞ , for incomplete information games as follows. For any set B = B 1 × · · · × B n ⊂ A and any i and t i , we seṫ
and define setsṠ
We define the set of locally interim correlated point rationalizable actions with respect to B bẏ
The following characterization holds as long as the best reply is always unique. 
That is, if one fixes the first k orders of beliefs according to t i and varies the higher-order beliefs using types from finite type spaces, then
] without going outside of it. This characterization of sensitivity of equilibrium via local interim correlated point rationalizability holds as long as there is always a unique best reply, e.g., when the action spaces are compact and convex sets and the utility functions are continuous and strictly concave in own action. In particular, it holds in generalized nice games with multidimensional action spaces. Our proof for Proposition 1 first obtains has a unique best reply to s * −i . Since the uniqueness of the best reply is already assumed in Proposition 4, our proof of Proposition 1 also proves Proposition 4.
Infinite type spaces
We have confined ourselves to finite type spaces, only because we can ensure existence of equilibrium in the space T u of finite types. Our main result extends to the equilibria of larger type spaces when they exist. Indeed, in our working paper (Weinstein and Yildiz, 2004) 
, where the last equality is by Proposition 1 and the fact that the restriction of s * to T u is an equilibrium on T u . 2
If one enlarges the type space by including more types, equilibrium only becomes more sensitive to higher-order beliefs because now there are more ways to vary the higher-order beliefs. Hence, our lower bound for the sensitivity of equilibrium, which is our main contribution, remains valid. Note, however, that as we enlarge the type space, the equilibrium may seize to exist. In that case, our result becomes vacuous.
None of the results mentioned here addresses the sensitivity of equilibrium strategies at the types that come from uncountable type spaces, although the corollary allows them in the space. The only reason for this is that the measurability problem in our proof cannot be avoided when uncountable types are included in our construction without further structure. Apart from this technical problem with our proof, there is no reason to suspect that the high sensitivity at finite and countable types would disappear at uncountable types.
Consistency and extension property of equilibria
In a genuine case of incomplete information we have no ex ante stage, and can only work with the players' hierarchies of beliefs. Since Harsanyi (1967) , these beliefs are modeled by a type in a type space. There can be multiple types from various type spaces that model the same situation. In that case, it is natural to require that the solution is the same for all such types, for otherwise the solution would be dependent on the way we model the situation. This is the consistency restriction used in this paper.
Nevertheless, Friedenberg and Meier (2008) have recently shown that a type space T may have an equilibrium that cannot be extended to a larger type space T , even if T does not have any "redundant" types, which have identical belief hierarchies. As we mentioned earlier, this cannot happen within T u : any equilibrium of a finite type space with no redundant types can be extended to T u (Yildiz, 2009) . When it does happen in a larger type space, consistent equilibrium selections may induce a refinement on the solutions of individual games, in a way that may not be anticipated by the researcher. For example above, one would necessarily exclude the non-extendable equilibrium of T by fixing an equilibrium s * on T and considering only the solutions induced by s * on subspaces. In order to analyze the sensitivity of the latter equilibria to higher-order beliefs, one needs to consider a more liberal restriction than consistency on the equilibrium selection.
Further literature review
In Weinstein and Yildiz (2007b) , considering action spaces that come from a compact metric space, and assuming a global stability condition, we showed that higher-order beliefs have exponentially decreasing impact on every Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the universal type space. In the present context, this implies that the equilibrium strategies are not sensitive to higher-order beliefs in nice games that satisfy the global stability condition, which are dominance solvable. In this paper, we observe more broadly that the sensitivity of equilibrium strategies is bounded above by local rationalizability, a fact that immediately follows from (2.1), which has been originally observed by Dekel et al. (2007) for rationalizability. The contribution of this paper is the lower bound: every equilibrium strategy has to be so sensitive to higher-order beliefs that it traces all locally rationalizable actions. For example, while Weinstein and Yildiz (2007b) emphasize the decreasing impact of higher-order beliefs in the dominance-solvable game of Cournot duopoly, here we emphasize that, in Cournot oligopoly, the equilibrium strategies are so sensitive to higher-order beliefs that one cannot make any non-trivial minimally robust prediction.
Recently, several papers took complementary approaches to weakening the richness assumption in WY. First, note that fixing a non-trivial dynamic game tree contradicts the richness assumption of WY. Chen (2008) shows, however, that the conclusion of WY remains intact under a weaker richness assumption that is satisfied by dynamic game trees with unrestricted payoff functions. Weinstein and Yildiz (2009) extends this result further to the games that are continuous at infinity, allowing uncountable action spaces in normal form. Without imposing a richness assumption, Penta (2008a) proves that the conclusion of WY holds for the (rationalizable) actions that can be traced back to dominance regions through successive best responses. Penta (2008b) analyzes the sensitivity to higher-order beliefs under common-knowledge restrictions on payoffs in a similar formulation to that of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) . He proves an analogous result to WY by using "interim sequential rationalizability". 
Appendix A. Proofs

A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
By the Maximum Theorem, β i is continuous, and since s * is an equilibrium, 
where the first equality is due to the fact that s * is an equilibrium, the second equality is by (A.2), the third is by definition of β i , and the last is by definition of α * .
(
Proof. We will use induction on k. For k = 0, part (1) (λ, η) ). By construction,
